WHY BARBAROSSA FAILED

On December 8, 1941, Adolf Hitler proclaimed that his army failed to capture Moscow because of “severe winter weather” and “difficulties in bringing up supplies.” After the Second World War, the chief of the German general staff, Franz Halder, blamed Operation Barbarossa's failure on the “vast immeasurable space” of the Soviet Union and the “limitations of the Russian transportation network.” For the past eight decades, historians have done little more than repeat these excuses as to why the largest invasion in history ended in defeat.

In Why Barbarossa Failed, Harvard Law School graduate Timothy Manion breathes new life into the scholarship of Operation Barbarossa based on his extensive research of the German and Soviet archives. Discarding the traditional excuses that have predominated in past narratives of the campaign, Manion examines the critical junctures that brought the panzer divisions to a halt. Long before before weather and logistics became a material impediment to its advance, the German army was defeated in a series of battles across the length of the front in the third week of July 1941. Manion identifies the common factor at the root of these defeats and traces its origins in the development of German army doctrine over the preceding century. The disastrous mistakes in Soviet leadership that made Operation Barbarossa possible in the first place are likewise examined in a comprehensive application of military theory to the largest military campaign in history. The failure of both armies to grasp the nature of modern warfare unleashed the bloodiest episode of human history and demands far greater scrutiny than historians have previously accorded to Operation Barbarossa.  

​Praise for Why Barbarossa Failed

“Timothy Manion argues lucidly and at times provocatively that the failure of Operation Barbarossa was not due to the commonly debated issues of the weather and logistics, but to wrong-headed strategy pursued by the Wehrmacht and it only achieved as much as it did due to equally wrong-headed Soviet military strategy. Manion bases his arguments on a solid exploration of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century strategic thinking and the antagonists’ interpretation of them. His account shows a mastery of the history of the campaign and the what-might-have-beens. This is fascinating reading!”

Roger R. Reese, Professor and holder of the Ralph R. Thomas Class of 1921 Endowed Professorship in Liberal Arts, Department of History, Texas A&M University; author of Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought and Russia’s Army

“A most learned study of Barbarossa, demonstrating astonishing familiarity with the operational details at all levels and offering a wealth of dazzling insights into the campaign. Fascinating reading, even if one does not agree with the author regarding the causes of Barbarossa's failure.”

Azar Gat, Ezer Weizman Chair in National Security, Tel Aviv University; author of War in Human Civilization and A History of Military Thought

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“I like that the book explicitly tries to test arguments against each other … it is a step forward in the right direction of establishing solid epistemological foundations for the analysis of military operations. The first chapter summarizing the military theoretical debates of the 19th and early 20th century alone is worth reading the book and should be assigned in war colleges.”

Olivier Schmitt, Professor and Head of Research at the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College; author of Preparing for War: Strategy, Power and Military Change and French Defence Policy Since the End of the Cold War

​​​Features:

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16 full-colour, never-before-published campaign maps from the German military archives.

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29 black-and-white maps, including 13 campaign maps from the German military archives. ​​

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10 tables and 5 diagrams.

12 chapters, 2 appendices, 372 pages.

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Available on Amazon:

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www.amazon.com/Why-Barbarossa-Failed-Germany-Russia/dp/180451909X

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