Errata

On 8 December 1941, Adolf Hitler proclaimed that his army failed to capture Moscow because of “severe winter weather” and “difficulties in bringing up supplies.” After the Second World War, the chief of the German general staff, Franz Halder, blamed Operation Barbarossa's failure on the “vast immeasurable space” of the Soviet Union and the “limitations of the Russian transportation network.” For the past eight decades, historians have done little more than repeat these excuses as to why the largest invasion in history ended in defeat.

 

In Why Barbarossa Failed, Harvard lawyer Timothy Manion takes historians to task for their failure to critically examine the post-war German narrative of their failed invasion of the Soviet Union. Discarding the common excuses that predominate in popular tellings, Manion offers a refreshingly original account of Operation Barbarossa taken directly from the German and Soviet archives. The critical battles that brought the German army to a halt are rigorously analyzed as Manion uncovers a significant but overlooked factor at the core of the German army’s defeats throughout the summer and autumn of 1941. Manion traces the roots of the fatal flaw in the German general staff’s approach to warfare through the development of German military doctrine over the course of the preceding century while contrasting it with the equally catastrophic strategy of the Red Army. The failure of both armies to grasp the nature of modern warfare unleashed the bloodiest episode of human history and demands far greater scrutiny than historians have previously accorded to Operation Barbarossa.  

 

​Praise for Why Barbarossa Failed:

 

“Timothy Manion argues lucidly and at times provocatively that the failure of Operation Barbarossa was not due to the commonly debated issues of the weather and logistics, but to wrong-headed strategy pursued by the Wehrmacht and it only achieved as much as it did due to equally wrong-headed Soviet military strategy. Manion bases his arguments on a solid exploration of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century strategic thinking and the antagonists’ interpretation of them. His account shows a mastery of the history of the campaign and the what-might-have-beens. This is fascinating reading!”

Roger R. Reese, Professor and holder of the Ralph R. Thomas Class of 1921 Endowed Professorship in Liberal Arts, Department of History, Texas A&M University; author of Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought and Russia’s Army

 

“A most learned study of Barbarossa, demonstrating astonishing familiarity with the operational details at all levels and offering a wealth of dazzling insights into the campaign. Fascinating reading, even if one does not agree with the author regarding the causes of Barbarossa's failure.”

Azar Gat, Ezer Weizman Chair in National Security, Tel Aviv University; author of War in Human Civilization and A History of Military Thought